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9.1  Motivation 
It has long been understood that insurance creates both benefits (risk reduc- 
tion) and costs (moral hazard-induced  distortions to incentives). The existence 
of so many insurance contracts in the market suggests that, in a wide variety 
of cases, the benefits exceed the costs of insurance coverage. But what happens 
if the company providing insurance fails and is unable to pay off policyhold- 
ers? Presumably, there should be a market for insurance against insurance- 
company failure. But this just pushes the problem back a step. What if the in- 
surer of the insurer fails? If consumers desire genuine protection against risk, the 
market, with or without the government’s help,  must figure out how  to in- 
sure the insurers. 
In the United States, the response to this problem has been the organization 
of quasi-governmental “guaranty funds” at the state level, each of which serves 
as the insurer of the insurance companies operating in that state. The state 
guaranty funds are implicitly backed by state governments, giving policyhold- 
ers reasonable certainty that their claims will be paid even if their insurance 
company becomes insolvent. 
But, just as insurance distorts incentives to individuals, the second-level in- 
surance provided by  the guaranty funds distorts the incentives of insurance 
companies. That is, guaranty-fund insurance creates incentives for insurance 
companies, especially those on the brink of failure, to engage in too much risk. 
But what form might this moral hazard take? Where might one look for evi- 
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Fig. 9.1  Number of property-casualty insurer insolvencies 
dence of  excessive risk? Does such evidence exist? These questions are the 
subject of this paper. 
A major motivation for this study was a finding in previous research (Bohn 
and  Hall  1995; Hall  1996) that  the  costs  of  resolving  property-casualty 
insurance-company failures are surprisingly large. The total cost of resolving 
a property-casualty insurer failure’ is in the range of  100-120  percent of  the 
company’s preinsolvency assets. This number is three to four times larger than 
analogous cost estimates of  resolving depository-institution failures.2 More- 
over, both the number of property-casualty  insurer insolvencies and the total 
costs of these insolvencies have risen in the last decade (see figs. 9.1 and 9.2). 
These large resolution costs suggest that the perverse incentives created by the 
guaranty-fund system may be large. That is, moral hazard may be an explana- 
tion for these large costs. 
The starting point for our analysis is the parallel between deposit insurance 
and the insurance provided by guaranty funds, both of which provide second- 
level insurance against ins~lvency.~  The existence of  (flat-rate) deposit insur- 
ance enables banks to engage in risky behavior without paying the appropriate 
1. The total cost of resolving failures is equal to the costs of paying claims, plus the administra- 
tive costs of the liquidators and guaranty funds, minus recoveries from asset sales. Bohn and Hall 
(1995) found that the ratio of costs to preinsolvency assets was equal to one. Using an updated 
data set, Hall (1996) found this number to be about 1.2. 
2. James (1991). Bovenzie and Murton (1988). and Barth, Bartholomew and Bradley (1991) all 
find that the net cost of resolving bank failures is about one-third of preinsolvency assets. 
3. There are two main differences between the deposit-insurance and guaranty-fund systems. 
First, unlike the bank-insurance fund, the guaranty funds are not prefunded (assessments are levied 
after insolvencies occur since there is no “fund”). Second, the guaranty funds are operated at the 
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Fig. 9.2  Aggregate net cost of resolving property-casualty  insurer insolvencies 
and total guaranty fund assessments 
price for their risk taking.4 Because depositors are insured against the risk of 
bank failure, they do not have incentives to monitor or discipline banks. Depos- 
its represent  a  risk-free,  and adverse-selection-free, form of  borrowing  for 
banks. This enables even the riskiest  of  banks to borrow in capital markets. 
Indeed, by raising deposit rates by small amounts, banks were able to attract 
large amounts of deposits (made easier by an active brokered deposit market), 
which they then invested in risky 10ans.~  The existence of deposit insurance 
(albeit in combination with other factors) is widely believed  to be the main 
cause of the savings-and-loan debacle, which in the end cost taxpayers approxi- 
mately $150 billion. 
Although it has been much less studied by academics, the insurance pro- 
vided by guaranty funds creates similarly perverse incentives.6  Although insur- 
ance companies do not accept deposits, they do receive premiums. Since there 
is a lag between the time that premiums are received and the time that losses 
are paid out, attracting premiums is a way to borrow from policyholders. The 
key similarity between the two systems is that guaranty-fund insurance dimin- 
ishes the incentives of policyholders to monitor or discipline insurance compa- 
nies, just as deposit insurance decreases the incentives for depositors to moni- 
tor banks. Thus, the guaranty-fund system creates a peculiar way for insurance 
companies to borrow with little discipline from capital markets-by  writing 
4. For an analytic proof, see Menon (1977). 
5. For analysis of  the savings-and-loan crisis and the perverse incentives created by  deposit 
6. Cummins (1988) analyzes how guaranty funds affect risk taking and how a risk-based pre- 
insurance, see Kane (1989). 
mium structure can reduce the perverse incentives of guaranty funds. 366  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
premiums. Consistent with this possibility, we find evidence of excessive pre- 
mium  growth by  property-casualty  insurers in the years before  insolvency. 
Moreover, this premium growth is more pronounced in long-tail lines, which 
have a long lag between premium payments and policyholder claims and there- 
fore represent a more attractive way for insurance companies to borrow from 
policyholders. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide some back- 
ground on the guaranty-fund system and describe the guaranty-fund rules. In 
the third section, we discuss the theory of how the guaranty funds create per- 
verse incentives for insurance companies, especially those on the brink of fail- 
ure. In the fourth section, we describe our data and present evidence on the 
degree of preinsolvency premium growth. In the fifth section, we disaggregate 
the premium growth into lines (e.g., personal property, corporate liability, etc.) 
and show that much of the fast growth in premiums is in long-tail lines. The 
sixth section contains some evidence on the relation between state regulatory 
resources and premium growth. The final section summarizes and contains ad- 
ditional discussion and interpretation of the results. 
9.2  Guaranty Fund Background and Description of Rules 
The guaranty-fund system was a response to a federal initiative in the late 
1960s to establish a guaranty system for insurance companies similar to the 
FDIC.’ Worried about a federal government “takeover” of insurance-company 
regulation,  the  National  Association  of  Insurance  Commissioners  (NAIC) 
proposed  model  legislation  for the establishment  of  guaranty  funds at  the 
state level. By the early 1970s, about three-fourths of the states had adopted 
guaranty-fund provisions that were closely based on the NAIC’s model act. 
Most of the other states followed shortly thereafter. 
Guaranty  funds are generally nonprofit associations of  all companies li- 
censed to write insurance within a state in lines covered by the guaranty fund. 
Insurance companies are required to be a part of the guaranty-fund system in 
order to obtain a license, The board of  each guaranty fund is composed of 
representatives from member firms and from the state insurance commission- 
er’s office. 
The state insurance departments, not the guaranty funds, are responsible for 
the regulation and oversight of insurance companies, which includes the pre- 
vention and detection of insurance-company insolvencies. Thus, involvement 
of the guaranty fund comes only after a company is declared to be insolvent, 
at which point the guaranty fund takes over the files of the failed insurer and 
pays the claims of policyholders. 
In most cases, guaranty funds pay the full amount of policyholder claims in 
the same way that payment would be made by insurance companies. However, 
7. Much of the material in this section is derived from Bohn and Hall (1993, Duncan (1987), 
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there are some caps and deductibles. In most states, and in most lines, the caps 
on the funds’ liability per claim are in the $300,000-$500,000  range. Thus, for 
the vast majority of  claims, especially in personal  lines, the caps are rarely 
binding. In addition, the deductibles are very  small, ranging from $0.00 to 
$200 per claim, with most funds having a deductible of $100. Note also that, 
since guaranty funds pay only for the claims of the policyholders residing in 
their state, a failure of  a multistate insurance company involves action on the 
part of multiple guaranty funds. 
State insurance departments are responsible for the liquidation of the assets 
of  the failed insurer. The proceeds of the liquidation are turned over to the 
guaranty funds to pay  the claims of policyholders. Hall (1996) has  shown, 
however, that, after paying all expenses related to the liquidation process, the 
state regulatory departments turn over an average of only thirty-seven cents for 
each dollar of  preinsolvency assets. Thus, there is typically a large shortfall 
between the assets of  the failed insurers and the obligations of the guaranty 
funds. The guaranty funds cover this shortfall by levying assessments against 
the solvent companies doing business in the state of the insolvent firms. The 
magnitude of  assessments is directly proportional to a firm’s  share of  direct 
premiums written within a state in lines covered by the fund.*  Thus, the size of 
assessments is not related  to any measure of  a company’s insolvency risk. 
Guaranty funds also make assessments to cover their administrative, legal, and 
other expenses. 
Guaranty funds are not really funds since all but New York operate on a 
postassessment basis. That is, guaranty funds maintain no reserves and assess 
member insurance companies only after an insolvency OCCU~S.~  In most states, 
the assessment amount is capped at 2 percent of premiums written per year, 
although some states maintain lower caps. In addition, most state regulations 
contain provisions that enable companies to partially offset assessments. For 
example, most states include the cost of assessments as a factor in determining 
premiums. In addition, many states allow insurers to recover a portion of their 
assessment with credits against their premium taxes, which shifts a portion of 
the costs of the insolvency to other state taxpayers. 
9.3  Theory: Guaranty-Fund Insurance and Moral Hazard 
We begin by thinking about an insurance company that is insolvent or nearly 
insolvent but still operating because it has not yet been “caught” by the regula- 
tors. The company is having trouble meeting its expenses because of misman- 
8. Guaranty funds are typically organized into separate accounts covering broad lines of insur- 
ance. The most common form of organization has three separate accounts-workers’  compensa- 
tion, automobile, and “all other” types of insurance. However, different states operate as few as 
one or as many as six accounts. 
9. New York State adopted guaranty-fund legislation in 1947. Unlike other funds, New York‘s 
operates on a preassessment basis. The state maintains a fund of $150-$200 million for the resolu- 
tion of  insurance failures. Firms writing insurance in the state are assessed whenever the fund 
balance falls below the lower bound. 368  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
agement, higher than expected losses, or some other circumstance. The man- 
agement of the firm would like the firm to continue operations. That is, the 
firm needs  to find some cash in order to continue operating (and to pay  its 
employees’ and executives’ salaries, among other things). There are three main 
options available to such a firm: 
Option 1. The company could raise outside financing. However, if the market 
requires the company to pay something even close to the appropriate risk pre- 
mium, such financing would be extremely costly. In addition, such a company 
may not be able to raise any outside financing at all because of credit rationing 
(see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Moreover, the current owners of such a firm are 
likely to have some knowledge of  the firm’s financial circumstances and are 
therefore reluctant to inject additional capital. 
Option 2. The company could sell off some of its assets to raise cash.I0 How- 
ever, such an action may be very transparent to regulators since assets are fairly 
easy to measure and value (at least relative to liabilities) and such firms do not 
want to become noticed  by the regulators.  These firms have an incentive to 
behave in ways that increase their riskiness, but they must balance the benefits 
of engaging in risky behavior against the costs of increasing the probability of 
getting caught. 
Option 3. The company could attract more premiums, perhaps at prices below 
expected costs. The key insight is that selling premiums is similar to taking out 
a loan; premium payments represent an immediate inflow of cash and require 
(probabalistic) payments to be made at a later date. However, because the guar- 
anty fund protects policyholders against insolvency risk, this type of  “loan” 
(i.e., selling of premiums) is an adverse-selection-free form of finance. In order 
to borrow in this peculiar way, firms do not have to pay a large risk premium 
(because the guaranty funds protects the lenders, who in this case are the poli- 
cyholders); nor do insurance companies need to worry about being credit ra- 
tioned out of the market when they borrow in this way. Perhaps equally impor- 
tant, it seems likely that option 3 would be less transparent to regulators than 
option 2 (selling assets) since reserving (which involves the estimation of the 
liability created by a particular policy) is an inexact science. That is, if a com- 
pany  needs  cash and wants to game the  system, it is likely  to be easier to 
write more premiums and reduce its reported liabilities  (by underestimating 
its future losses) than to sell off its assets, which are more easily measured 
by regulators. 
To see why writing premiums is essentially borrowing money from policy- 
holders consider the following equation: 
10. In related work, Hall (1996) presents evidence that the assets of  many failed companies are 
of poor quality, which is consistent with this possibility. 369  The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers 
where P is premiums, C is costs, r is the interest rate, and L is losses. The left- 
hand side of  the equation shows the revenues, net of the cost to operate the 
company, that a company generates during the year from writing premiums. 
Assuming for simplicity that  all losses come in the subsequent period,  the 
right-hand side shows the expectation of next-period losses at time t + 1. Com- 
petitive pressures, or, more precisely, a zero-profit condition, imply equality 
between the two in expectation. Note that, when a firm writes a policy, it essen- 
tially borrows premiums (net of costs), which it then pays back to policyhold- 
ers with interest. 
This equation can be rewritten as: 
The left-hand side is equal to borrowing by the insurance company, and the 
right-hand side is equal to the net present value of (collective) repayment by 
policyholders. Without guaranty-fund insurance, an insolvent or nearly insol- 
vent company’s repayments would be heavily discounted by lenders (policy- 
holders). In practice, this would mean that premium prices would have to be 
lowered substantially. However, the existence of  guaranty-fund insurance re- 
moves the riskiness of  “lending” to insurance companies, enabling them to 
borrow at something close to the risk-free rate. This implies that, because of 
guaranty-fund insurance, highly risky insurance companies should be able to 
increase their premiums  (and, therefore, their cash flow) substantially with 
only small changes in premium prices. 
As noted earlier, our story of how the guaranty-fund system affects the in- 
centives of insurance companies is very similar to models in the banking litera- 
ture about the moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance. De- 
posit insurance enables banks, even risky ones, to borrow from depositors at 
the risk-free rate. The incentive to borrow at the risk-free rate and use the funds 
to make high-risk loans is especially attractive to poorly capitalized banks. 
Deposit insurance and limited liability combine to give the owners of the com- 
pany what is essentially a put option. For banks “at the money” or “out of the 
money” (insolvent or nearly insolvent), increasing the volatility of their eam- 
ings increases the value of the bank. 
That same principle applies to insurance companies. The incentive to bor- 
row excessively from policyholders (attract premiums) and to use themoney 
to make risky investments (perhaps by writing high-risk policies andor  under- 
reserving) is especially strong for insurance companies that are already insol- 
vent. Like the banks, they face “heads-I-win-tails-somebody-else-loses”  in- 
centives.  Indeed,  Kane  (1989) has  argued  that  the  combination  of  poorly 
capitalized banks, deposit insurance, and regulatory forbearance created what 
he termed savings-and-loan zombies, so-called because they sucked the life 370  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
out of  the healthy  savings and loans by competing away their business with 
their aggressively risky behavior. This put the solvent savings and loans at risk, 
which in turn created more zombies. Although we do not test for this in our 
empirical section, our analysis of the incentives created by the guaranty funds 
suggests at least  the possibility  that the guaranty-fund  system could create 
zombie insurance companies. 
Finally, it should be noted that an extreme case of  our story of how  in- 
surance companies can game the guaranty-fund  system  is through  a Ponzi 
scheme. In our previous story, insurance companies were gaming the system 
by maximizing the expected value of the company, which involved high risks 
since the downside is essentially capped at zero. Under a Ponzi scheme, even 
a company that has no hope of  ever becoming solvent can play. A company 
can increase premium growth while writing negative net present value (NPV) 
policies. When the losses occur, the company can pay these claims by writing 
even more negative NPV policies. A company  can then live to another day, 
with all the benefits to management that are associated with continued opera- 
tions. As is well known, however, all Ponzi schemes eventually fail. We come 
back to this issue in the final section, where the results are discussed and inter- 
preted. 
9.4  Preinsolvency Premium Growth 
One way to examine the moral hazard effects of guaranty-fund insurance is 
to analyze how company financial condition correlates with risk-taking behav- 
ior. Ideally, one could analyze whether exogenously determined poor financial 
conditions were associated with excessive premium growth and other types of 
risk-taking behavior. However, in addition to the difficulty in finding a good 
instrument for financial condition, even using uninstrumented capital ratios as 
a measure of financial condition may be problematic. If our measure of capital 
is quite noisy (because companies that are gaming the system are also able to 
manipulate their book-value  measure of  capital), then a correlation between 
truly low capital rates and game playing may be hard to detect. Moreover, if, 
in addition to those companies gaming the system, there are many responsible 
companies-companies  with negative shocks to their capital positions behave 
conservatively  in the next period in order to regain their preshock financial 
status (a type of mean reversion)-then  it will be difficult to find evidence of 
gaming the system even if such evidence exists. Thus, although this approach 
(analyzing all companies in poor financial condition) has considerable merit, 
it also has potentially serious problems. We thus decided to take a different ap- 
proach. 
Our approach is to examine the preinsolvency  behavior of companies that 
become insolvent. While this approach does not represent a formal test proving 
causality between the guaranty fund and risk taking (measured by excessive 
premium growth in this case), it does have an obvious advantage: if game play- 
ing does exist and is serious enough to cause a significant number of insolven- 371  The Moral Hazard of  Insuring the Insurers 
cies, then one should be able to detect a pattern of excessive premium growth 
prior to insolvency in a sample of failed companies. 
9.4.1  Data Description 
Our sample consists of property-casualty insurance firms that failed between 
1987 and 1995. The initial set of failed firms was assembled from Best’s Insur- 
ance Reports and the list of failures involving guaranty-fund activity provided 
by the National Conference of  Insurance Guaranty Funds (see NCIGF 1991- 
93). For each failed firm, we searched Best’s and LexdNexis for the date on 
which the firm was declared insolvent.” All our analysis was conducted at the 
firm rather than the group level. We define year t as the year in which the firm 
was found to be insolvent. Years prior to the year  of  failure are henceforth 
referred to as t - 1,  the calendar year prior to the year in which the firm was 
found insolvent, t -  2, t -  3, and so forth. 
The set of  firms was then merged  with accounting  information  from the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners’s (NAIC) annual statement 
database. Firms that did not file annual statements in the three years prior to 
insolvency were omitted from the sample. Thus, we have information concern- 
ing the financial position and business mix of each active firm for the three- 
year period prior to assumption of management of the firm by regulators. There 
are 135 failed insurance companies in our sample. 
9.4.2  Results 
In this section, we look for evidence that insurance companies are gaming 
the system by examining the preinsolvency premium growth of firms that fail. 
Figure 9.3 plots the distribution of failed companies in terms of their premium 
growth in the two years prior to insolvency. This represents premium growth 
from year t -  3 to year t -  1 since t is defined to be the year of  insolvency. 
Specifically, the figure plots the percentage of (failed) property-casualty insur- 
ance companies that had premium growth of 0-10  percent, 10-20  percent, and 
so on in the two-year period prior to insolvency.’* The striking feature of  the 
distribution is the extremely high number of companies in the “high-premium- 
growth” tail, both as a proportion of the total and relative to the proportion of 
companies in the center of the di~tribution.’~  For example, more than 35 per- 
cent of failed companies had total premium growth of more than 50 percent 
(in real terms) in the two years prior to failure. 
11. The sequence of events involved in the takeover of a failed insurance company by the regula- 
tors is similar across states; however, terminology differs substantially. For our purposes, a court 
order declaring the insurer insolvent, the placement of the firm in rehabilitation, and the placement 
of the firm  in conservation are equivalent since all three events entail the regulators assuming 
primary responsibility for the management of the firm. 
12. A very  similar pattern emerged when we  looked at premium growth in the year prior to 
failure (f  -  2 to t - l), but we focus on growth rates in the two years prior to insolvency to 
decrease the possibility that idiosyncratic factors in one year generate noisy growth rates. 
13. Note that, in its Insolvency Reporr (1991), A. M. Best also reports high premium growth for 
property-casualty insurance companies that subsequently failed. 372  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
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In order to determine whether the large percentage  of  high-growth  firms 
in  the failed  sample is unusual,  we compared  our sample with  a matched 
sample-on  the basis of asset size and year failed. In order to reduce noise, we 
picked four matches (the two nearest larger and the two nearest smaller) for 
each of our 135 failed firms. The two-year premium-growth rates are plotted 
in figure 9.4. While the matched sample also contains a reasonably large num- 
ber of high-growth companies, presumably  because these firms are relatively 373  The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers 
small by industry standards, the percentage of high-growth  firms is less than 
half the percentage of  high-growth  companies in the failed sample. The evi- 
dence suggests that there is an unusually large percentage of firms that grew 
quickly prior to failure. This is consistent with the view that the incentives 
created by  the guaranty  funds are leading to moral-hazard-induced fast pre- 
mium growth. 
9.5  Premium Growth and Business Composition 
In the previous section, we showed that a disproportionate number of failed 
insurance companies had unusually high premium growth prior to failure. In 
this section, we disaggregate the premiums into line composition to determine 
which lines were associated with this growth. The key question is, If insurance 
companies are gaming the system, which lines are they likely to increase the 
most? 
9.5.1  Long-Tail Lines 
There are several reasons to suspect that insurance companies that seek to 
game the system are likely to use premium growth in long-tail lines. First, it is 
harder to estimate the future losses in long-tail lines precisely. Liability claims 
are less predictable than, for example, physical damage from automobile ac- 
cidents. While insurance companies  normally  find uncertainty  about future 
losses an unattractive feature, it is a desirable characteristic for a company that 
wishes  to game the  system by underreserving.  Second, the simple fact that 
long-tail  lines  create  long-term  borrowing  opportunities  for  insurance- 
company  garners  makes premium  growth in  these  lines attractive.  The one 
thing desired by insurance companies that want to game the system is more 
time. Increasing premium growth in long-tail lines enables companies to buy 
that time. 
9.5.2  Results 
In order to test this possibility, we divided our failed sample into fast-growth 
(real premium growth of over 50 percent between year t -  3 and year t -  1) 
companies and slow-growth companies. We then looked at how the fraction of 
premiums in long-tail lines changed for the fast-growth firms relative to the 
slow-growth firms in a variety of lines of business. (The precise definitions of 
how we categorized the lines of business appears in the appendix.) The results 
are presented in table 9.1. The first three columns show the results for the forty- 
seven fast-growth companies. The fraction of premiums written in the specific 
line is shown for t -  3, then t -  1, followed by the change between the two 
years. The results are then repeated for the eighty-seven  slow-growth firms in 
the next three columns. 
The results indicate that fast-growth companies increased their fraction of 
premiums in long-tail lines from an average of about 31 percent to almost 70 374  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 9.1  Failed Firms Partitioned by Growth Rates" 
Fast  Fast  Slow  Slow 
Mean  Mean  Change  Mean  Mean  Change 
Line of Business  t-3  r-  1  in Fast  r-3  1- I  in Slow 
% in long-tail lines  30.98  69.79  +38.81  62.56  59.84  -2.73 
property  28.25  21.14  -7.10  18.69  16.78  -1.91 
liability  14.53  40.00  +25.47  28.21  24.94  -3.27 
property  41.51  12.79  -28.71  22.78  29.53  6.74 
liability  15.70  26.05  +  10.35  30.31  28.74  -1.56 
% in personal 
% in personal 
% in corporate 
% in corporate 
% in workers' 
compensation  13.61  9.74  -3.88  13.44  12.85  -.59 
% in automobile  38.31  58.43  +20.12  40.38  36.01  -4.36 
Statistical Tests of Changes 
Change  Change  r-Test  Wilcoxon 
in Fast  in Slow  (p-value)  (p-value) 
% in long-tail lines  +38.81  -2.13  .0263  ,0396 
% in personal property  -7.10  -1.91  ,5089  ,603  1 
% in personal liability  +  25.47  -3.27  .0111  ,0041 
% in corporate property  -28.71  6.74  .0370  ,1691 
% in corporate liability  +  10.35  -  1.56  ,3962  ,7364 
% in worker's compensation  -3.88  -.59  ,2404  ,9762 
% in automobile  +20.12  -4.36  .0069  ,0193 
'Includes forty-seven high-growth and eighty-seven low-growth failed firms. 
percent. This represents a 39 percentage point increase in the share of business 
in long-tail lines. By contrast, the fraction of premiums in long-tail lines for 
the slow-growth firms was essentially unchanged, falling by about 3 percent- 
age points. Moreover, both  a t-test and a Wilcoxon rank sum test, which are 
shown in the bottom portion of table 9.1, confirm that the differential change 
in the share between fast-growth firms (38.8 percent) and slow-growth firms 
(-2.7  percent) is statistically  significant. The strong relative movement into 
long-tail lines for the potential garners (firms with fast premium  growth) is 
therefore consistent with our theory that increasing long-tail lines is a desirable 
way to game the system. 
In order to determine more precisely which lines fast-growth insurers are 
moving into, we adopt narrower definitions of the insurer's lines of business. 
The results are shown in the next six rows of table 9.1. First, the four combina- 
tions of personalkorporate and property/liability are considered. Then, work- 
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while there is some change in the lines of the fast-growth  firms, none of the 
categories of lines change significantly for the slow-growth firms. Unlike the 
fast-growth companies, these slow-growth companies march forward toward 
insolvency with little aggregate change in the composition of their business. 
Second, the primary reason for the increase in the fraction of premiums in 
long-tail lines for the fast-growth firms is the increase in personal, not corpo- 
rate, liability lines, as indicated by the aggregate 25 percentage point increase 
in the share in personal liability lines. There is only a 10 percent increase in 
the share of corporate-liability lines, and this change is not statistically differ- 
ent from the near-zero (- 1.6 percent) change in the corporate-liability share 
for the slow-growth firms. 
There are at least two reasons why gaming firms may choose to increase 
growth in personal liability premiums rather than in corporate-liability premi- 
ums. First, losses in corporate-liability  lines tend to be larger and are therefore 
more likely to exceed the guaranty-fund caps. Thus, corporate buyers of liabil- 
ity insurance may care about the solvency of insurers in a way that individual 
buyers do not. Second, corporate-insurance purchasers are likely to be better 
informed about the rules and the financial condition of the insurer than individ- 
ual purchasers of liability insurance. That is, the relative inability of individu- 
als who purchase liability insurance (which consists primarily of automobile- 
liability insurance) to learn about and understand the guaranty-fund rules may 
make  growth  in  this  category  ideal  for companies  that  want  to game  the 
guaranty-fund system. The large (20 percent) increase in the fraction of premi- 
ums in automobile for the fast-growth firms, shown in the last row, is consistent 
with this story. 
In order to test the robustness of these basis results, we compared the fast- 
growth  failed  companies  with  a  matched  sample  of  fast-growth  nonfailed 
(again, greater than 50 percent growth) companies. Each high-growth  failed 
firm was matched by size and year with four high-growth  healthy firms. The 
results, shown in table 9.2 and using the same procedure as in table 9.1, tell 
the same basic story. All the comparisons are basically the same, which is not 
surprising given that, like the slow-growth failed firms, the fast-growth non- 
failed firms show little change in any of the lines of business. The fact that 
potential gamers (fast-growth failed firms) increase their fraction of premiums 
in  long-tail  lines (especially  personal  liability) while  a similar set of  fast- 
growing nongaming  firms  does  not  strengthen  the  case  that  premium  line 
changes of the gamers is unu~ua1.I~ 
As a final test, we compared the slow-growth failures with a matched set 
14. If  companies are gaming the system with fast premium growth, then, unless they are all 
Ponzi schemes, some companies should be expected to succeed (k.,  to gamble and remain sol- 
vent). Our ability to find a matched sample of  fast-growing nonfailed firms is consistent with this 
story. That is, our sample of  fast-growth nonfailures may include some “gamers” that succeed. 376  James G.  Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 9.2  High-Growth Firms Partitioned by Failure” 
Failed  Failed  Matched  Matched 
Mean  Mean  Change  Mean  Mean  Change in 
Line of Business  t -  3  f -  1  in Failed  t-3  1-1  Matched 
% in long-tail lines 
9%  in personal 
property 
% in personal 
liability 
% in corporate 
property 
% in corporate 
liability 
% in workers’ 
compensation 
% in automobile 
30.98  69.79  +38.81  45.21  48.40  +3.19 
28.25  21.14  -7.10  26.42  24.64  -1.79 
14.53  40.00  +25.47  17.86  19.21  +  1.35 
41.51  12.79  -28.71  35.11  33.41  -1.71 
15.70  26.05  +10.35  20.59  22.74  +2.15 
13.61  9.74  -3.88  4.21  6.14  f1.93 
38.31  58.43  +20.12  34.69  33.15  +  .46 
Statistical Tests of Changes 
Change  Change  f-Test  Wilcoxon 
in Failed  in Matched  (p-value)  (p-value) 
% in long-tail lines 
% in personal property 
% in personal liability 
+38.81  +3.19  ,0483  ,0406 
-7.10  -  1.79  ,4952  ,2984 
+25.47  +  1.35  ,0160  ,0002 
% in corporate property  -28.71  -1.71  .0909  ,1042 
% in corporate liability  +  10.35  +2.15  ,555 1  .023 1 
% in workers’ compensation  -3.88  -1.93  ,0338  ,0514 
% in automobile  +20.12  f  .46  ,0036  .o009 
’Includes 47 high-growth failed firms and 187 high-growth solvent firms matched by the calendar year of 
the annual statement and assets in year t -  2. 
(again, matched by size and year) of  slow-growth nonfailures.  Results of the 
comparison appear in table 9.3. Neither group showed any significant change 
in its line of busine~s,’~  so it is not surprising that the statistical tests showmo 
statistical differences between (the changes in) the two groups. Both the failed 
slow-growth and the nonfailed  slow-growth companies seem to be marching 
forward with little change in their mixes, the former into insolvency, the latter 
into relative prosperity. 
Finally,  we  used  regression  analysis  to  determine  whether  the  relative 
changes in business composition hold controlling for various factors. We com- 
bine the samples of failed and matched firms from tables 9.2 and 9.3 to deter- 
mine whether  the potential gamers  (fast-growth  failed  firms) changed their 
business composition relative to nongamers. The change in the share of a firm’s 
15. It has already been established in table 9.1 above that the slow-growth failed companies did 
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Table 9.3  Slow-Growth Firms Partitioned by Failure" 
Failed  Failed  Matched  Matched 
Mean  Mean  Change  Mean  Mean  Change in 
Line of Business  r -  3  t -  1  in Failed  r-3  t- 1  Matched 
% in long-tail lines  62.56  59.84  -2.73  44.15  44.90  +  .75 
% in personal 
% in personal 
% in corporate 
% in corporate 
% in workers' 
compensation  13.44  12.85  -.59  6.00  6.06  +  .06 
% in automobile  40.38  36.01  -4.36  29.21  30.02  +.81 
property  18.69  16.78  -1.91  30.66  29.76  -  .90 
liability  28.21  24.94  -3.27  15.42  16.61  +1.19 
Property  22.78  29.53  6.74  31.89  32.63  +  .72 
liability  30.31  28.74  -1.56  22.03  20.98  -1.04 
Statistical Tests of  Changes 
Change 
in Failed 
Change  r-Test 
in Matched  (p-value) 
% in long-tail lines  -2.73 
% in personal property  -1.91 
% in personal liability  -3.27 
% in corporate property  f6.74 
% in corporate liability  ~  1.56 
-  .59 
% in automobile  -4.36 
% in workers' compensation 
+.75  .4816 
~  .90  ,5533 
+1.19  .4 149 
+  .72  ,3028 
-  1.04  ,8227 
+  .06  ,6106 










'Includes  87 slow-growth failed firms and 350 matching solvent firms matched by the calendar year of 
the annual statement and assets in year r  ~  2. 
line of business was regressed on a constant, FAST (equals one if a fast-growth 
firm), FAILED (equals one if failed), and FASTFAIL, the interaction of FAST 
and FAILED. FASTFAIL is the coefficient of interest since this coefficient 
indicates how garners change their business composition relative to nongam- 
ers. We also included additional control variables, which are defined in the ap- 
pendix. An indicator for MUTUAL was included. ASSETS was included as a 
proxy for size, and LEVER, the ratio of liabilities to assets, was included to cap- 
ture the capital position of the firm. 
The results, shown in tables 9.4 and 9.5, tell a similar story. In the specifica- 
tion with the change in the fraction of long-tail lines as the dependent variable, 
the coefficient on the interaction term FASTFAIL is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating a significant increase (about 39 percentage points) in the 
fraction of long-tail lines for potential garners. Moreover, as before, this in- 
crease is in personal liability and automobile lines, as indicated by the positive 
and significant coefficients on FASTFAIL in those two specifications. Con- 378  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 9.4  Change in Business Composition  prior to Failure 




























(.078  1) 
(.0142) 
















-  ,0030 
(.0104) 





-  ,0438 
Note; Dependent variable is the change in the share of  a firm’s business in each line between year 
t -  3 and year t -  1, where t = 0 is the year of  insolvency. Sample contains 134 failed and 532 
matched solvent firms. All independent variables are defined in the appendix. Heteroskedasticity- 
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5  percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
versely, when corporate liability is the dependent variable, the coefficient on 
FASTFAIL is positive, but the magnitude is small (0.08) and not close to being 
statistically significant. In sum, the results of tables 9.4 and 9.5 corroborate the 
findings of the earlier tables. 
9.6  Regulatory Resources and Excessive Premium Growth 
The final issue that we address is whether there is any evidence that a higher 
level of resource expenditures by state insurance regulators is effective in re- 
ducing the amount of excessive premium growth. To the extent that companies 
are gaming the system in the way we have described, one would expect that 
increased regulatory scrutiny, which is likely to be positively correlated with 
the state’s regulatory resources, would reduce the degree of game playing. 
In order to test this idea, we employ a logit model with high growth as the 
dependent variable and various measures of regulatory resources as the explan- 
atory variables. As in the earlier sections, we define high-growth firms as those 
that increase premium growth by 50 percent or more between year t -  3 and 
year t -  1. We also include the same control variables as in tables 9.4 and 9.5. 
The measures of regulatory resources include BUDCOl and BUDC02, the 
state regulatory budget divided by the number of insurance companies in the 379  The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers 
Table 9.5  Change in Business Composition prior to Failure 
Commercial  Commercial  Workers’ 
Variable  Property  Liability  Compensation  Automobile 
INTERCEPT  ,0203  -  .0372*  -.0010  .0370** 
FAST  -.0297*  .0428***  .0203*  -.0125 
(.0240)  (.0189)  (.0108)  (.O 179) 
(.0159)  (.0151)  (.0110)  (.0170) 
FAILED  .OW  -  ,0068  -  .0066  -.0450 
(.0555)  (.0230)  (.0136)  (.0596) 
FASTFAIL  -.3280**  ,0838  -  .05  15*  .2505*** 
(.1648)  (.1379)  (.0289)  (.0895) 
MUTUAL  -.0141  .0207*  -  ,0020  -  .0046 
(.0149)  (.O 12  1)  (.0042)  (.0177) 
ASSETS  p.0142  ,0706  ,0539  -  ,0390 
(.0366)  (.  11  82)  (.0472)  (.0398) 
LEVER  -.0162  ,0342  .Doll  -  ,0508 
(.0510)  (.0323)  (.0200)  (.0354) 
Adjusted R2  ,0374  ,0141  ,0153  ,0325 
Note:  Dependent variable is the change in the share of a firm’s business in each line between year 
r -  3 and year t -  1, where t = 0 is the year of insolvency. Sample contains 134 failed and 532 
matched solvent firms. All independent variables are defined in the appendix. Heteroskedasticity- 
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
state (determined two ways;  for precise definitions, see the appendix), and 
EXAMCOl and EXAMC02, the number of examiners in the state’s regulatory 
office divided by  the number of companies (again, defined two ways). Greater 
regulatory resources may limit the ability of insurers to game the system. An 
increased number of examiners may make it more likely that regulators will 
be able to detect unusual activity by an insurer. Regulators can then either take 
action to curtail the activities of  a firm or petition the court to declare the 
insurer insolvent and placed under state supervision. In most cases, the entity 
filing the petition of insolvency is the office of the insurance commissioner in 
an insurer’s state of  domicile. Thus, the resources available to the commis- 
sioner in the state of  domicile should have  some effect on the ability of  an 
insurer to game the guaranty fund. 
The problem, of course, is that none of the measures of regulatory resources 
are exogenous. In particular, one might expect that an increase in insurance- 
company risk taking might lead to a greater need for regulatory resources. This 
biases the results against finding that more regulatory resources lead to lower 
game playing. Nevertheless, we believe that this exercise is worth doing to see 
if there is evidence of a regulatory effect in spite of this bias. 
The results with the failed sample are shown in table 9.6. In all four cases, 
the coefficient on regulatory resources is negative, indicating that more re- 380  James G.  Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
Table 9.6  Logit Model of the Likelihood of Fast Premium Growth for Failed 
Property and Casualty Insurers 















(  1  1.90 10) 









(1  1.8983) 
-  1.0433 
(3228) 





-  20.8848* 
(1  1.4587) 






,095 1  ,1288 
1.49 1  O*  * 
(.7285) 
-  1.2244 
(3601) 
-  19.0954* 






Nore: Fast premium growth is defined as a 50 percent or greater real increase in direct premium 
writings between t -  3 and t -  1, where f = 0 is the year of  insolvency. Dependent variable = 1 
if company exhibited high growth in direct premium writings, 0 otherwise. N = 132 with 47 high- 
growth firms and 85 low-growth firms in each model. Independent variables are defined in the 
appendix. Asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses. Excludes firms domiciled in Puerto 
Rico and U.S. territories. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5percent level. 
sources are associated with a decreased probability that the company is a high- 
growth gamer. Moreover, two of the coefficients are significant at the 5 percent 
confidence level, and one is significant at the 10 percent level. In terms of the 
implied magnitude of the effect, the coefficients imply that a 10 percent in- 
crease in the amount of budgetary resources is associated with approximately 
a 0.9 percent decrease in the probability that the firm is high growth (model 
1).  Using model 3, the results indicate that a 10 percent increase in the number 
of examiners is associated with a 2 percent decrease in the probability that the 
firm is high growth. Thus, the magnitudes of the coefficients imply a modest, 
but not insignificant, effect. 
The same tests are then repeated for the nonfailed sample. These results are 
shown in table 9.7. The coefficients on the budgetary variables are again nega- 
tive, but, as expected, the effects are smaller in magnitude.I6 Moreover, none 
16. The effect of a change in regulatory resources on the likelihood of a solvent firm  falling into 
the fast-growth category is about one-fifth as large as it is for the corresponding model using 
failed firms. 381  The Moral Hazard of  Insuring the Insurers 
Table 9.7  Logit Model of the Likelihood of  Fast Premium Growth for the 
Matched Set of Solvent Property and Casualty Insurers 












-  1.3015*** 
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(5.4194) 
-  1.0957*** 
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-  19.7396*** 
(5.4325) 







-  1.2952*** 
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-  19.7042*** 
(5.4087) 
-  1.1245* ** 
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Nore: Fast growth is defined as a 50 percent or greater real increase in direct premium writings 
between t -  3 and t  ~  1, where t = 0 is the year of insolvency. Dependent variable = 1  if company 
exhibited high growth in direct premium writings, 0 otherwise. N  = 526 with  186 high-growth 
firms and 340 low-growth firms in each model. Independent variables are defined in the appendix. 
Asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses. Excludes firms domiciled in herto  Rico and 
U.S. territories. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
are statistically significant. These results should be interpreted with the caveat 
that they are weak and are biased in the direction of not finding a relation 
between regulatory resources and game playing. Nevertheless, taken together, 
the results suggest that more regulatory resources may be effective in curbing 
excessive premium  growth by  firms attempting  to game the guaranty-fund 
system. 
9.7  Summary and Conclusion 
The savings-and-loan and commercial banking crisis of the late 1980s and 
1990s led to a large literature on the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance. 
Research on the moral hazard of the guaranty-fund system-the  moral hazard 
of insuring the insurers-pales  in comparison. This paper is an attempt to fill 
that gap. 
We  first explain the mechanism through which the guaranty-fund system 
may create moral hazard and then describe how this moral hazard might mani- 
fest itself in terms of  insurance-company behavior. We start with a parallel 382  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
between bank deposit insurance and guaranty-fund insurance, both of  which 
provide second-level insurance against the failure of the relevant financial in- 
stitution. Just as deposit insurance enables banks to borrow at the risk-free rate 
from insured  depositors, guaranty-fund insurance enables insurance compa- 
nies to borrow  at (approximately) the risk-free rate from policyholders. The 
key insight is that premium payments are similar to borrowed funds since there 
is a lag, which is particularly  long in long-tail lines, between premium pay- 
ments and policyholder claims. Thus, we argue that one way that insurance com- 
panies can game the guaranty-fund system is through a peculiar type of borrow- 
ing-fast  premium growth. 
The patterns that emerge in the data are consistent with this story. More than 
one-third of  insolvent  property-casualty insurance companies had  very high 
premium growth in the two years prior to failure. And, as might be expected if 
companies are gaming the system in the way we have described, this premium 
growth was more pronounced in long-tail  than in short-tail lines. Moreover, 
the increase in long-tail lines was driven by  personal liability  lines-where 
the guaranty-fund caps are less likely to be binding-rather  than corporate- 
liability lines. Finally, it was shown that excessive premium growth was less 
pronounced in states that had greater regulatory resources. Taken together, the 
results are strikingly consistent with the moral hazard story that we have de- 
scribed. 
Despite this, it is possible that the risky insurance-company  behavior that 
we have documented would have occurred even without the guaranty-fund sys- 
tem. For example, it may be the case that insurance companies take advantage 
of buyers who are relatively uninformed about the financial condition of the 
firm. Thus, insurance companies may be able to game the system by increasing 
premium growth to these “credit-insensitive” buyers. Indeed, this story is con- 
sistent with the evidence that premium growth was more pronounced in per- 
sonal lines than in corporate lines; it seems likely  that individuals  are less 
informed than corporations about the  financial condition of insurance com- 
panies. 
Although  our  analysis  reveals  some  striking  patterns  consistent  with 
guaranty-fund-induced  moral  hazard,  it  is clear  that  additional  research  is 
needed to establish the extent to which the risky behavior documented in this 
paper is caused by  the existence of the guaranty-fund system. One potential 
direction for future research is to make use of the state variation in guaranty- 
fund caps. Although this variation is not large, such an approach has the poten- 
tial to provide a purer test of the proposition that guaranty-fund insurance cre- 
ates moral hazard. In addition, if good insurance-company  data can be found 
for the  1960s, another possibility  is to compare insurance-company  behavior 
before and after the introduction of the guaranty-fund  system. Finally, as dis- 
cussed in section 9.4, yet another approach is to start with the set of all insur- 
ance companies and then analyze how firm financial conditions influence firm 
risk taking. 383  The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers 
Additional research is also needed to increase our understanding of the na- 
ture and degree of insurance-company risk taking. This study has considered 
only one type of moral hazard-excessive  premium growth. Our understand- 
ing of the incentive effects of insurance-company regulation would be greatly 
increased by an investigation of other ways in which insurance companies en- 
gage in excessively risky behavior. 
Appendix 
Business Mix Definitions 
Personal property  = Farmowner’s  and  homeowner’s  multiple  peril, 
Personal liability  = Automobile liability. 
Corporate property 
automobile physical damage. 
= Commercial multiple peril, fire, allied lines, earth- 
quake, aircraft, inland and ocean marine, financial 
guarantee lines. 
Corporate liability  = Workers’  compensation,  medical  malpractice, 
products  and  other  liability, accident  and  health 
Lines. 
Long-tail lines  = Personal and corporate-liability lines and financial 
guarantee lines. 
Automobile  = Automobile  liability  and  automobile  physical 
damage. 
Workers’ compensation = Workers’ compensation. 
Data Definitions 
FAST  = FAST = 1 if  the direct premiums  written by  the insurer in- 
creased by more than 50 percent in real terms in the two years 
prior to insolvency, that is, between year t -  3 and year t -  1. 
FASTFAIL  = FASTFAIL = 1 if FAST = 1 and the firm became insolvent in 
year t, 0 otherwise. 
MUTUAL  = MUTUAL = 1 if  the firm  has a mutual form of  ownership, 
0 otherwise. 
ASSETS  = The assets of the firm in billions of 1994 dollars on the annual 
statement filed on 31 December of year t -  3, where year t is 
the year of insolvency. 
= The ratio of liabilities to assets of the firm on 31 December of 
year t -  3, where t is the year the firm was found insolvent. 
= The budget of the insurance commission in the state of domi- 
cile divided by the number of firms domiciled in that state. In- 
surance commission budget is for the year 1990, and the num- 
LEVER 
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ber of firms domiciled in the state is taken from Best 5 Solvency 
Study-Property/Casualty. 
EXAMCOl = The number of examiners employed by the insurance commis- 
sion in the state of domicile divided by  the number of  firms 
domiciled in that state. The number of examiners is for the year 
1990, and the number of  firms domiciled in the state is taken 
from Best 5 Solvency Study-Property/Casualty. 
= Same as BUDCOl with the exception that the number of firms 
domiciled in the state was obtained from the 1990 demograph- 
ics file of the NAIC annual statement database. 
EXAMC02 = Same as EXAMCOl  with the exception that the number of 
firms domiciled in the state was obtained from the 1990 demo- 
graphics file of the NAIC annual statement database. 
BUDCO2 
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Comment  Christopher M. McGhee 
The Bohn and Hall paper provides a clear exposition on an important aspect 
of the risk-management issues that one needs to try to understand when think- 
ing about the insurance industry. 
There are essentially two main parts of Hall and Bohn’s thesis. First, when 
insurance companies are on the brink of insolvency, they raise cash the cheap- 
est way they can. For insurance companies, this means that they write more 
premium  and  that  this  growth  is concentrated  in  long-tail  personal  lines 
classes, especially personal automobile liability. Intuitively, this seems logical, 
and the data that Hall and Bohn present is reasonably convincing. A point that 
is not examined in the paper, but that also seems likely, is that, given that these 
companies operate in a competitive marketplace  (a safe assumption  in the 
United States), they can do this only by cutting prices. There is a reasonable, 
if not high, probability that they do this at prices that are too low. It would 
be helpful to attempt to ascertain if this speeds and/or deepens the insurance 
company’s insolvency. It seems plausible that it would at least deepen the insol- 
vency. If one were to discover that insurance companies, in fact, generate new 
business by  cutting prices, then it would be interesting to try and see what 
effect insurance market cycles might have on the data. The point is simply that, 
if prices are high relative to risk at a given point in time, companies engaging 
in this “inappropriate” behavior might get away with it for a longer period of 
time than if the market were soft. Said another way, one might expect to see a 
lag in the insolvency rate relative to the period of rapid premium growth under 
these circumstances. It is also clear that, if the business is being “bought” by 
these companies by cutting prices, this complicates Hall’s and Bohn’s analysis 
significantly, as one needs to know whether consumers are credit insensitive 
or, conversely, whether they are willing to take the increased credit risk if they 
get enough price discount. 
The second main part of the thesis posits how insurance companies can con- 
vince consumers to pay them premium, that is, effectively loan them the use 
of their premium dollars. The authors suggest that the presence of state guar- 
anty funds makes these consumers less credit sensitive than they would other- 
wise be if no guaranty fund existed. The authors conclude that the rapid pre- 
mium  growth  of  many  insurers,  particularly  in  long-tail  lines for private 
individuals, in the two years preceding their insolvency suggests that this is 
true. On this point, I am less convinced as there are other possibilities that 
could explain the data. 
Let me pose an alternative explanation. One could categorize buyers of in- 
surance in many different ways, but, here, I suggest that we categorize and 
rank them into four categories on the basis of their credit sensitivity (or rather 
lack of it), as follows. 
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The first group would be those individuals who are not credit sensitive with 
respect to the premiums that they pay for insurance. One can come up with at 
least three reasons why this might be true. First, the consumer thinks of insur- 
ance premiums as a tax (as might be the case for mandatory automobile insur- 
ance) and as such tries only to get the cheapest premium. Second, this group 
may perceive that the credit risk is so small that it essentially does not matter. 
After all, these consumers might say, “I really care a lot only if the insurance 
company won’t pay when I have a loss, and the chances that I have a loss are 
so small that I don’t really think I’m going to have one. Otherwise I lose only 
my premium.” (But most consumers think that they “lose” their premium when 
they pay it anyway.) Consumers, one might guess, would think of this credit 
decision very differently than when they put their life savings in a bank. Cur- 
sory review of some of the data that Hall and others have provided suggests, 
in fact, that the expected value of the credit risk that consumers face when they 
lend to banks is an order of magnitude or two greater than when buying insur- 
ance policies. Finally, this group would include those who just do not know 
enough to think about credit risk-the  truly credit-risk insensitive. 
Our next three groups are all credit sensitive, but their judgments are influ- 
enced by different factors and information. 
Our second group is credit sensitive, but these consumers’ own credit-risk 
evaluation is unaffected by  the presence of guaranty funds. This is because 
they may not know that they exist. Indeed, this is not implausible when one 
considers that, in about half the states, insurance agents operate under a “gag” 
rule that enjoins them from telling their customers that a guaranty fund even 
exists. This group may rely instead on ratings from the rating agencies, and 
rating agencies may be slow to catch “misbehaving” insurers until it is too late. 
Our third group of insurance buyers is also credit sensitive, but these con- 
sumers are affected by the presence of guaranty funds. Bohn and Hall suggest 
that consumers fall into this category. It bears considering, however, that in this 
group one might also include those individuals who do not know of the exis- 
tence of the guaranty funds explicitly but simply think that the government 
will pay if  a failure occurs. It would be interesting to attempt to ascertain 
whether this perception varies depending on the cause of insolvency, that is, 
whether the insolvency is caused by a disaster (e.g., a humcane or an earth- 
quake) or by a “normal” insolvency. Note that there is a potentially important 
counterargument to critics of guaranty funds embedded here. That is, if people 
think that the government will step in to help them out in the event of a failure, 
and if they think this regardless of whether they know of the existence of guar- 
anty funds, then it could be argued that having the guaranty funds is beneficial 
because at least it provides a well understood and reasonably orderly process 
for handling the claims of insolvent companies. 
Our fourth group of insurance consumers is made up of the most sophisti- 
cated buyers of  insurance. Here, again, the presence or absence of guaranty 
funds has little to do with their buying decisions. This group knows that guar- 387  The Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers 
anty funds exist. But they also know that limits apply on how much can be 
paid out from a guaranty fund. They are likely to be aware that, if they buy 
from an insurance company that then becomes insolvent and they then have to 
make a claim against the state guaranty fund, significant time delays in actually 
getting paid would almost certainly occur. Such time delays are not very palat- 
able to customers who have just suffered a large financial loss. Furthermore, 
this group may know that the state guaranty funds are unfunded and may not 
have confidence that the funds could pay one hundred cents on the dollar if a 
really  large insolvency, or a series of insolvencies, occurred.  Those in  this 
group are likely to rely on the credit assessment  of rating agencies and their 
own intermediaries for credit information. It is worth noting that a large per- 
centage of commercial insurance business is placed through insurance brokers. 
Brokers work for the insured and therefore may be more focused on protecting 
the interests of their clients than would insurance agents who are legal repre- 
sentatives of the insurance carrier. 
These are our four groups. We might consider who falls into each of our 
four categories. Taking our fourth group first (our very sophisticated buyers), 
one might reasonably think that this includes many, if not most, buyers of com- 
mercial insurance. 
The other three categories would presumably  be composed predominately 
of private individuals buying personal lines coverages. I suspect that consum- 
ers who buy only automobile insurance are more likely to fall into category 1, 
our least-credit-sensitive  group. I suspect this because one might guess that, if 
they have a mortgage, most home buyers are influenced by the lending institu- 
tion to use '%"-rated  security or better, at least for their home loan, and thus 
are educated to at least some modest extent to be credit sensitive. 
An insurance company  with declining credit worthiness  trying to rapidly 
grow its premium writings would presumably go after the less-sophisticated 
buyers of insurance in categories 1,2, and 3, with special emphasis on category 
1, that is, our credit-insensitive group. The authors' data is consistent with this, 
as rapid premium growth was concentrated in the sale of personal automobile 
insurance. 
Under my alternative explanation, only one of  our four groups actually is 
sensitive to the presence of the guaranty funds, and it is possible that most of 
the rapid premium growth may not come from this group. 
What matters, of  course, is how much of  the buying population falls into 
each of  our categories.  Bohn  and Hall's  analysis would be significantly ex- 
tended by attempting to measure the credit sensitivity of the insurance-buying 
population.  Note that the fact that guaranty funds were created strongly sug- 
gests that many believe that a significant portion of  the population  is credit 
insensitive. The authors have acknowledged that further research on this sub- 
ject is needed. Nevertheless, the paper is an excellent start with regard to the 
public policy issues that the presence of guaranty funds create. 
As a postscript, it may be instructive to note that the presence of moral haz- 388  James G. Bohn and Brian J. Hall 
ard has been well understood in the reinsurance industry and that the reinsurers 
(the insurers of insurers) structure what they sell to respond to this risk. With- 
out going into any detail, I would  simply note that, traditionally, reinsurers 
have effectively been selling long-term contracts, but with an annual right to 
review their deals, change the terms, or exit completely. In this review process, 
information gathering much beyond  what is publicly available is taken  into 
account. This gives the reinsurer powerful protection from being gamed over- 
time by an insurer. Note that this “behavior-regulation” effect is largely absent 
in guaranty funds. One might try to examine, therefore, whether the presence 
or absence of reinsurance correlates with insolvency. 
Comment  David Scharfstein 
Insurance companies have long understood the concept of moral hazard-that 
insuring their clients against adverse events induces them to take less caution 
than they  otherwise would.  If James  Bohn  and Brian Hall are correct, as I 
think they are, insurance companies have learned a lesson from their clients. 
Insurance companies are themselves insured by state guaranty funds. The re- 
sult of “insuring the insurers,” according to Bohn and Hall, is that insurers 
become aggressive risk takers when they become financially distressed. 
Bohn and Hall start by  observing that insurers can increase revenues  by 
offering insurance policies at more attractive premiums. Because they are in- 
sured by state guaranty funds, customers care little about whether the insurance 
company will have enough capital to pay any future claims. Thus, financially 
distressed insurers have an easy way of avoiding liquidation in the short run; 
they simply price low, increase premiums written, and use the income to pay 
off short-term loans. Of course, in the longer run, there will be claims against 
the insurers, and they will not have the capital to meet their obligations. In- 
stead, the guaranty funds foot the bill. The story is not too different from the 
savings-and-loan failures of the 1980s and the subsequent bailouts. 
The paper marshals three pieces of evidence that together suggest that the 
description given above is a valid one. First, Bohn  and Hall find that many 
property-and-casualty insurers failed after very high premium growth. Second, 
much of the premium growth is in long-tail lines, where there is much greater 
uncertainty about future losses. The greater uncertainty means that the insurer 
could get lucky and have limited losses. And, third, this risk-taking behavior is 
less pronounced in states where regulatory oversight is greater. 
The first two facts alone are not enough to tell a compelling story that failed 
insurers game the system by taking excessive risk when they get into financial 
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trouble. The bankruptcy courts are littered with companies-financial  and non- 
financial alike-that  tookrisks and lost. For example, the airline People Express 
went bankrupt  after a period of  rapid growth. In the year that it went bank- 
rupt alone, its revenue grew by nearly 25 percent. It gambled, and it lost. It is 
the third fact-in  combination with the other two-that  convinces me that failed 
insurers were taking excessive risk; they gambled less when there was more 
regulatory oversight. This tells us that many of the insurers consciously exacer- 
bated the problem by using the  state guaranty  funds to subsidize their risk- 
taking behavior. 
While Bohn  and Hall have identified the moral hazard  costs of  the state 
guaranty fund, it is hard to go from their analysis to any claims about whether 
the system is worthwhile. Because the analysis looks only at the insurers that 
actually failed, we do not know anything about the insurers that were able to 
avoid distress owing to the guarantees of the fund. For example, absent a state 
guaranty fund, it would be difficult for an insurer with some unlucky  large 
losses to get any new business or retain its old customers because of a fear that 
their claims would not be paid. The loss of these customers would exacerbate 
the problem and make it more likely that the insurer would not be able to pay. 
Default would be a self-fulfilling prophecy. This argument is similar to the 
rationale behind deposit insurance for banks. 
To get some sense of the costs and benefits of state guaranty funds, it might 
be better to analyze the behavior of  distressed or poorly performing insurers 
rather than just the failed insurers. The critical question is how these insurers 
respond to distress. Some will choose to take excessive risk and will fail; others 
will recover without taking excessive risk. Thus, one could estimate the frac- 
tion of insurers that accelerate premium growth (particularly in long-tail lines) 
after the onset of distress. And one could estimate the extent to which this is 
related  to regulatory  oversight and caps on guaranty funds. These estimates 
will give some sense of the extent to which state guaranty funds induce ineffi- 
ciencies. 
Finally, it is worth thinking about how one could improve the current system. 
Ideally, just as there is risk-based deposit insurance, one would like insurers to 
pay  risk-based  insurance  premiums;  that  is,  less  well-capitalized  insurers 
should pay more into the state guaranty funds. In this way, insurers internalize 
at least some of the costs of taking excessive risk. However, the current system 
is the exact opposite of  what one would want. The more highly capitalized, 
less risky insurers end up paying more to the state guaranty funds because they 
are forced to bail out their bankrupt competitors. One would hope that, just as 
the bank defaults led to changes in the way banks are regulated, the defaults of 
property and casualty insurers would also lead to changes in the way insurers 
are regulated. This Page Intentionally Left Blank